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Law and Administrative Discretion
SIR DAVID

G.T. WILLIAMS, Q.C. °

Sir David Williams originally presented this paper as the
inaugural lecturer for the Ralph F. Fuchs lecture series at the
Indiana University School of Law on April 15, 1993. Professor
Fuchs was a faculty member of the Indiana University School of
Law from 1945 until his death in 1985. He was an important
contributor to the drafting of the Administrative Procedure Act of
1946, president of the Indiana Civil Liberties Union, an active
participant in the National Association for the Advancement of
ColoredPeople, a leader of the American Association of University
Professors, and a fighter forfree speech and thought in academic
institutions during the McCarthy era.
Sir David Williams begins his paper with a briefdescription of
the history of English administrative law, noting that it has
developed more slowly as compared to administrative law in the
United States. He then discusses a case at the root of English
administrative law-Roberts v. Hopwood, a judgment issued in
1925. Williams proceeds to analyze administrativelaw development
in England, including the doctrines of judicial review, control of
administrativediscretion, and the complementary, evolving doctrines
of administrative discretion andjudicial deference, as exemplified
by the authoritative dissent in Liversidge v. Anderson. Williams
also stresses the relationshipbetween democratic idealsandjudicial
deference to the decisions of local authorities. He concludes by
describingthe ever-evolving nature of administrativelaw in England
today, arguing thatjust as in the 1920s, the underlying approach of
the courts to questions in administrativelaw can only be interpreted
by taking into account the multitude of circumstancesfrom which
such questions arise.

I. PREFACE
It is with special pride that I inaugurate this series of annual Lectures
established in honor of Ralph Follen Fuchs. Professor Fuchs was described,
in the course of the Special Commemoration Meeting held in March 1985,
*

Professor of Law and Vice-Chancellor, University of Cambridge.
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as Indiana University's "Jewel in the Crown"; everything that I have read
and heard of his remarkable career in academic and public life confirms that
accolade. At the same Commemoration Meeting tribute was paid, in
particular, to his belief in "freedom, justice and human dignity."
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: HISTORY AND COMPARISON
Administrative law, an area of the law that gained early
sophistication in France, was until well into this century largely
unrecognized in the United States. Then, almost overnight, what Felix
Frankfurter termed "this illegitimate exotic" overwhelmed the profession
"which for years had been told of its steady advance by the lonely watchers
in the tower."' Since the 1920s the subject has expanded relentlessly,
rapidly adapting, both in principle and in case law, to new demands and
pressures as demonstrated, for instance, by Dean Aman in Administrative
Law in a Global Era.2
In the United Kingdom, the subject languished for much longer. In the
past two or three decades, however, English administrative law has
undergone a revolution and the academic and professional literature is now
considerable. Yet, even though English administrative lawyers can now
look their American counterparts in the eye, comparisons are not easy and
there are important differences of approach and terminology.
Some of the difficulties in drawing comparisons are obvious enough.
There is no supreme written constitution in the United Kingdom, and
Dicey's doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament is still internally regarded
as preeminent. In other words, there is no judicial review of legislative
action: only in the seventeenth century was there any hint of an earlier
Marbury v. Madison and that was abandoned soon enough when Parliament
triumphed over the Crown in the political struggles of the day. Even so,
British membership in the European Community since 1973 has radically
disturbed the insular confidence of Parliamentary sovereignty. The debates
over the Treaty of Maastricht reflect the tensions behind seeking to reconcile
the old and the new, national self-sufficiency and supranational assertions.
Reference to two further aspects of Parliamentary sovereignty-the
absence of federal government and the absence of a Bill of Rights-brings
1.

Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614, 616 (1927).

2.

See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA (1992).
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home the impossibility of speaking in simple, absolute terms. The fact that
we have just one primary legislative body compared to fifty-one in the
United States should not disguise the fact that there are pressures of
fragmentation within the United Kingdom3 and, more important, possibly
irresistible federal pressures at the European level. The absence of a Bill of
Rights may be a principal reason why the United Kingdom appears to be in
total confusion over critical areas of free speech, public assembly, and
personal freedom; but, here again and with implications for administrative
law, there is some measure of external monitoring generated through the
European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human
Rights.
To add to the difficulty of comparison in administrative law, consider
the fact that there are separate legal systems throughout the United Kingdom
for England and Wales, for Scotland, and for Northern Ireland. In these
systems, the House of Lords through an Appellate Committee is the supreme
court in civil matters. For the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, the old
supreme tribunal for the original colonies, the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council, still operates as the final court of appeal. Next we should
note that the United Kingdom does not have great regulatory agencies akin
to those developed in the United States since 1887, though we do have an
extensive and not unsuccessful network of administrative tribunals. The
civil service or public service associated with government departments is
powerful and well protected through the convention of ministerial
accountability, which is itself historically linked to the judicial deference or
timidity familiar up to the late 1950s. Governmental secrecy, a long-term
rejection of open government, is part and parcel of central administration in
the United Kingdom: there is no Freedom of Information law and there is
still an Official Secrets Act that imposes penalties for the unauthorized
disclosure of information. Nor is it just a question of central government;
local authorities have played a very prominent role in the administration of
the United Kingdom over the past century and a half, compensating in part
for the absence of units in a federation. Their functions have been
important in such areas as public health, planning or zoning, minor criminal

3. Examples of this fragmentation include: Northern Ireland, in the context of the wider Irish
problem; Scotland; to a lesser extent, Wales, in the context of devolution or even separation; and the
special position of the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man.
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offenses, and education; many of the important cases in English
administrative law have stemmed from the exercise of such functions.
Roberts v. Hopwood is a leading case, dating from the 1920s and
arising in the context of local government, to which I will now turn. An
analysis of this case may help to demonstrate that despite the difficulties of
comparing English and American law, and despite the impressive range and
quality of recent literature on both sides of the Atlantic, there has been a
remarkable continuity in the problems posed at the interface of law and
administration. A study of the case may also bring out some of the special
features of the English system of administrative law.
III. POPLARISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
Roberts v. Hopwood, once regarded as the high-water mark of judicial
activism in administrative law, was concerned with the control of
administrative discretion. In any explanation of the principal grounds of
judicial intervention in English administrative law, pride of place belongs to
abuse of discretion and to breach of natural justice (or of procedural due
process), with which I am not concerned today. Abuse of discretion has
spawned an ill-assorted array of words and phrases, often used
synonymously, such as unreasonableness, irrationality, ulterior motive,
improper purpose, failure to take into account relevant considerations, taking
into account irrelevant considerations, bad faith, and much else.
The decision in Roberts v. Hopwood arose from events in the
Metropolitan Borough of Poplar, then one of the poorest areas of the East
End of London and dominated in its elected council by members of the
Labour Party. One of the leading figures on the Council was George
Lansbury, an early campaigner for women's votes, a protagonist of social
justice, and later the Leader of the Labour Party nationally from 1931 to
1935. There was a distinct militancy about him and his compatriots on the
Council. For instance, early in the 1920s the Council of Poplar refused to
impose elements of local taxation required for other bodies such as the
London County Council. After refusing to obey a writ of mandamus, the
Mayor and twenty-nine of his colleagues were jailed for contempt of court.
The experience of a few weeks of incarceration did little to quench their

4.

Roberts v. Hopwood [1925] App. Cas. 578.
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enthusiasm for a branch of politics that came to be known as "Poplarism,"
and new battles lay ahead.5
In the further pursuit of social justice as they saw it, the Council decided
to maintain the position of a model employer. Under the authority of
legislation of 1855, which empowered a metropolitan borough council to
pay to its servants such wages as the council "may think fit," the Poplar
Council resolved in the financial year ending 31 March 1922 to pay its own
employees, male or female, a minimum wage of £4.00 a week. The
resolution was adopted in the face of a sharp decline in the cost of living
nationally and, consequentially, lower rates of wages. The Council might
in due course have been challenged politically, but in law they initially felt
secure because the legislation appeared to give them the widest discretionary
power, couched in subjective terms, to pay such wages as they might think
fit.
Much was to be made in resulting litigation of the implicit claim for
uncontrolled discretion, a topic familiar enough on both sides of the
Atlantic. For many years the English courts were willing to concede the
possibility of unfettered discretion, especially with regard to the statutory
authority of Government ministers and especially in the face of subjectivelyworded powers. Attitudes have changed significantly in light of the leading
cases since 1968.6 Where local authorities were concerned, however,
unfettered discretion was never so readily conceded. Counsel before the
courts in Roberts v. Hopwood argued that the discretion "conferred upon the
council is not an uncontrolled discretion, but must be exercised
reasonably," 7 and the courts agreed. In a similar vein it has been confirmed
in the United States that the "requirement that discretion must be exercised
reasonably is not changed by broad statutory grants."8 In Barlow v.
Collins,9 for instance, the statutory power of the Secretary of Agriculture
to make such regulations "as he may deem proper to carry out the
provisions of this chapter" was held not to bar the intervention of the courts.
A judge of the Supreme Court of Canada put it neatly when he said that

5.

See generally NOREEN BRANSON, POPLARISM, 1919-1925:

GEORGE LANSBURY AND THE

COUNCILLORS' REVOLT (1979); B. Keith-Lucas, Poplarism, 1962 PUB. L. 52; G.W. Jones, Herbert
Morrison and Poplarism, 1973 PUB. L. 1I.
6. See Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] App. Cas. 997.
7. Hopwood [1925] App. Cas. at 580.
8.

BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 10.15, at 655 (3rd. ed. 1991).

9.

Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 165 (1970) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 590(d)(3)).
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"there is always a perspective within which a statute is intended to
operate.""°
The councillors at Poplar had, through the manner in which they
exercised their discretion, invited scrutiny and challenge. The challenge,
when it came, arose not through the orthodox challenges of judicial review
but through the monitoring of local government expenditure by a body of
departmental officials known as district auditors. Under the law then in
force, district auditors were empowered to disallow any item of account
"contrary to law" and to "surcharge" the disallowed sum on the person or
persons responsible. This in effect gave the district auditors authority to
question the exercise of discretion and to impose monetary penalties as well.
Until 1922 even Poplar had been largely free of conflict with district
auditors, save for a £10.00 surcharge for the cost of the band that serenaded
the councillors during their time in jail for contempt." Nevertheless, the
truce was now over.
If district auditors had not been invented, Poplar's councillors could
have been challenged directly in the courts. The most obvious way would
have been by seeking a writ of certiorari or of mandamus. Since 1977,
English law has provided for an all-encompassing remedy called "an
application for judicial review," which allows for one or more of the
remedies of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, declarations, and injunctions.
The extraordinary expansion of English administrative law in the last fifteen
years is inextricably linked to this new mechanism. One distinguishing
feature of English administrative law that has been inherited from the old
prerogative remedies, a feature that has been rejected in most other common
law jurisdictions, is the requirement of leave. In other words, an application
for judicial review can be argued only after leave has been granted by the
court; the issues that can be raised at the leave stage include standing,
exclusionary clauses, the arguability of the case, and other problems such as
justiciability and judicial restraint. The requirement has been criticized as
an artificial bar to access to the courts and defended both as "a remarkably
quick, cheap and easy method"' 2 of securing an early judicial ruling and

10. Roncarelli v. Duplessis [1959] S.C.R. 121, 140 (per Rand, J.).
1I. See Keith-Lucas, supra note 5, at 69.
12. Sir Harry Woolf, Public Law-PrivateLaw: Why the Divide? A Personal View, 1986 PUB.
L. 220, 230.
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as an ultimate safeguard against the floodgates opening in particular areas
of dispute. The first of those arguments in defense is the more convincing.
Such considerations did not initially arise at Poplar. Instead, the district
auditor took objection to the level of wages paid by the Council, disallowed
what he calculated as excessive expenditure, and surcharged that sum upon
the councillors who had voted for the resolution. The councillors responded
by seeking what we now call judicial review. They obtained a rule nisi for
a writ of certiorari to quash the district auditor's certificate of disallowance
and surcharge. At the court of first instance, the Divisional Court of the
King's Bench Division (consisting of three judges headed by the Lord Chief
Justice, Lord Hewart), the arguments failed and the rule was discharged. 3
The Court of Appeal, however, by a majority reversed that decision and the
rule was made absolute (certiorari was granted). 4 Finally, the House of
Lords unanimously overruled the Court of Appeal and restored the decision
of the Divisional Court. 5 In terms of the judges involved, the district
auditor (named Carson Roberts) had won by nine to two, but-as we shall
see-quality and quantity should not be too hastily merged.
The case against Poplar rested on the rejection of unfettered discretion
(despite the breadth of the statutory language) and on the ruling that the
councillors had abused their discretion. They had abused their discretion,
first, by failing to take into account relevant considerations, which would
have included the cost of living and the scale of wages being paid by
employers in the commercial sector. Secondly, they had taken into account
irrelevant considerations: Lord Sumner in the House of Lords said that a
council "acts for a collateral purpose, if it fixes by standards of its own on
social grounds a minimum wage for all adults,"' 6 and Lord Atkinson
declared that the councillors had "allowed themselves to be guided ... by
some eccentric principles of socialistic philanthropy, or by a feminist
ambition to secure the equality of the sexes in the matter of wages in the
world of labour."' 7 In holding that the councillors had "deliberately
decided not to be guided by ordinary economic (and economical)
considerations,"' 8 the majority judges agreed that the wages paid were, in

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

The King v. Roberts, ex parte Scurr [1924] 1 K.B. 514 (D.C.).
The King v. Roberts, exparte Scurr [1924] 2 K.B. 695 (C.A.).
Roberts v. Hopwood [1925] App. Cas. 578.
Id. at 606.
Id. at 594.
Id. at 609 (per Lord Sumner).
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many instances, gifts or gratuities superimposed on proper remuneration for
services.
It is tempting to regard the tone of the remarks by Lords Atkinson and
Sumner as dated and almost quaint. In fact, while Lord Atkinson's words
about "socialistic philanthropy" were cited with approval by the Lord Chief
Justice in a case of 1960,'9 the words about feminism were omitted. In
addition, in 1982 the rejection of excessive wages in Roberts v. Hopwood
was approved of even though it was judicially recognized that some of their
Lordships' comments might, "with the benefit of hindsight, appear
unsympathetic."20 The lack of sympathy was quite obvious, even at the
time, and neither Lord Sumner nor another of their Lordships in Roberts v.
Hopwood, Lord Carson, had always been sensitive to the appropriate
boundaries of their functions. Judicial members of the House of Lords are
also legislative members of the House of Lords, and the convention that is
normally observed-as a pale gesture to the Separation of Powers-is that
the possessors of that dual role should refrain from overt political matters
on the floor of the House of Lords. Yet Lord Carson, soon after becoming
a Law Lord, made a speech castigating the Anglo-Irish Treaty of December
1921 in such vehement terms that the Lord Chancellor-who is allowed to
be a politician as well as a judge and much else besides-stated in the
House that, "as a constructive effort of statecraft, it would have been
immature upon the lips of a hysterical school-girl. 21 Moreover, Lord
Carson was supported by Lord Sumner, and both returned to the fray over
the legislation of 1922 that led to the creation of the Irish Free State.
Neither could have been accused of being amorphous dummies "unspotted
by human emotions. 22
It may have been a lurking awareness of their political leanings that led
some of the majority judges in Roberts v. Hopwood to seek an additional
factor to shore up or reinforce their ruling on abuse of discretion. In a
broader sense, the courts are bound to be aware of the wide judicial
discretion that they exert in questioning the exercise of administrative
discretion; it is possible in many decided cases to identify the additional
factor that is employed to offer reassurance. A factor that emerged

19.
20.
21.
22.

Taylor v. Munrow [1960] 1 All E.R. 455, 462.
Pickwell v. Camden London Borough Council [1983] I All E.R. 602, 618 (per Forbes, J).
48 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 204 (1921).
Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 43 (1920) (McReynolds, J.,
dissenting).
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tentatively in Roberts v. Hopwood was the so-called fiduciary duty owed by
elected councillors to the local ratepayers or taxpayers, a doctrine that was
to achieve even stronger support in later cases up to the 1980s. It is at best
an ill-considered and inappropriate doctrine, as one of the minority judges
in Roberts v. Hopwood recognized,23 not least because of its effect in
emphasizing misuse of discretion in the expenditure of money rather than
recognizing that there can also be misuse of discretion through what counsel
described as "cheeseparing or undue economy"24 in the performance of
statutory functions by a local authority. Nevertheless, for many years it
provided a security blanket for courts uneasy and uncertain in the control of
administrative discretion at the local level. Now that judicial intervention
is much more widely accepted at all levels of administration, it is apparently
no longer needed.
Other factors were doubtless present in Roberts v. Hopwood. A concept
that was not to be openly canvassed until many years later is that of
proportionality, but the elements were there in Roberts v. Hopwood. The
councillors agreed, for instance, that the surcharge imposed upon them could
"only be justified, if at all, on the grounds that the outlay is so entirely out
of proportion to the necessities of the case that some part of it is illegal."25
Lord Atkinson, returning to the topic of women, said that it did "not appear
to me that there is any rational proportion between the rates of wages at
which the labour of these women is paid and the rates of which they would
be reasonably remunerated for their services to the council."26 It may well
be, as a distinguished academic commentator in England has said, that the
principle of proportionality has long been available "as inherent in the
principle of reasonableness"27 and Roberts v. Hopwood may simply be
evidence of that availability.
Another factor that weighed in the decision was the need for informed
judgment on the part of those exercising administrative discretion. In the
High Court of New Zealand in 1988, for instance, Wylie, J., wished to stress
that a statutory discretion entrusted to the Minister of Transport must be
exercised in an informed way. He quoted Lord Wrenbury in Roberts v.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

The King v. Roberts, exparte Scurf [1924] 2 K.B. 695, 726.
Hopwood [1925] App. Cas. at 583.
Id.
Id. at 600.
SIR WILLIAM WADE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 429 (6th ed. 1988).
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Hopwood to the effect that a person in whom is vested a discretion "must,
by the use of his reason, ascertain and follow the course which reason
directs. 28 In a similar vein, Richardson, J., said in the Court of Appeal
that the duty to exercise the statutory discretion on reasonable grounds
"necessarily requires that the Minister be adequately informed as to the
29
relevant considerations and that he takes them into account.
IV. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT

The councillors of Poplar had failed, then, on the rejection of unfettered
discretion, on the finding of abuse of discretion, and through recourse to
additional factors, including the alleged fiduciary duty to ratepayers, the
principle of proportionality, and the need for informed judgment.
Nevertheless, they enjoyed a triumph in the Court of Appeal, and it is
instructive to see what judicial arguments could prevail against the scorn
later shown by Lords Sumner and Atkinson. The majority in the Court of
Appeal consisted of Atkin, L.J., and Scrutton, L.J., two of the outstanding
twentieth-century judges in England, and neither could be accused of an
inclination to be unduly deferential to administration. Indeed, Atkin, L.J.,
was later, at the height of the Second World War (as Lord Atkin), to deliver
one of the most blistering attacks ever launched against both the central
administration and his fellow judges in the House of Lords.
The case was Liversidge v. Anderson.3 ° The appellant had been
detained under the Defence Regulations that allowed the Home Secretary to
detain someone where he had reasonable cause to believe that the person
concerned was of hostile associations and that, by reasons of such
associations, he or she should be detained. By a majority, the House of
Lords held that the words "If the Secretary of State has reasonable cause"
should mean "If the Secretary of State thinks he has reasonable cause," and
this subjective interpretation meant that the Minister's discretion to detain
was not open to question in the courts. The sole dissent was that of Lord
Atkin, who invoked precedent in support of an objective interpretation of the
statutory wording. He viewed with apprehension the attitude of fellow

28. Hopwood [1925] App. Cas. at 613.
29. Auckland City Council v. Minister of Transport [1990] 1 N.Z.L.R. 264, 285 (Wylie, J.), 303
(Richardson, J.).
30. Liversidge v. Anderson [1942] App. Cas. 206.
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judges who, on a mere matter of statutory construction, showed themselves
more executive-minded than the executive. Lord Atkin stated that the
arguments advanced by the Attorney General, who represented the Home
Secretary, might have been addressed acceptably to the Court of King's
Bench in the time of Charles I (that, incidentally, led one of his fellow
judges, Lord Maugham, to seek the ultimate recourse under the British
Constitution--he wrote a letter of protest to The Times). Finally, Lord
Atkin declared that he knew of only one authority that might justify the
construction adopted by his colleagues: 'When I use a word,' Humpty
Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to
mean, neither more nor less."' 3
The other members of the House of Lords in Liversidge v. Anderson
were doubtlessly influenced by the fact that the Defence Regulations had
been made for the safety of the realm, and the safety of the realm was by
no means assured on 3rd November 1941, the day the judgment was
delivered. Only a few months had gone by since the German invasion of
Russia; only a few weeks remained before Pearl Harbor. Many years later,
Lord Diplock judicially recognized "that the majority of this House in
Liversidge v. Anderson was expediently and at that time, perhaps, excusably
wrong and the dissenting speech of Lord Atkin, was right."32 That
comment could, it seems, be turned around to say that the majority was right
in the context and circumstances of the case. Whether in the United States
or in the United Kingdom, it is all too easy to make retrospective
corrections of legal decisions made in times of national emergency. What
the majority judges in Liversidge v. Anderson did was to employ the
national emergency to strengthen the traditional doctrine of ministerial
responsibility, to leave the decision on the detention of aliens to the political
rather than to the legal arena, and in consequence to exercise powerful
judicial restraint in refusing to intervene. Accountability for the Home
Secretary's decision, if any, would be on the floor of the House of
Commons.3 3
Ministerial responsibility is no longer, as it was during the Second
World War and for some years afterward, an automatic formula to be

31.

32.
33.

LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS.

Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Rossminster Ltd. [1980] App. Cas. 952, 101 1.
See generally Colin Turpin, MinisterialResponsibility: Myth or Reality?, in THE CHANGING
CONSTITUTION 53 (Jeffrey Jewell & Dawn Oliver eds., 2d ed. 1989).
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invoked to ensure judicial restraint in challenging the central administration.
Nevertheless, the courts are often divided when confronted with
discretionary decisions made by Ministers on major issues of national
interest. A vivid example of such divisions occurred in a decision of March
1991 in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The Judicial
Committee, which is the alter ego of the House of Lords, is still the final
appellate court for New Zealand. This case concerned a Minister's
discretion in New Zealand in the award of licenses for oil exploration.34
The trial judge in the High Court of New Zealand, anxious to avoid
appearing to question the merits of the Minister's actions, emphasized "that
questions of policy are not for the Courts but are for the policy makers, the
Minister, the Cabinet, and the Government."35 His ruling in favour of the
Minister was overturned by a four to one ruling of the Court of Appeal of
New Zealand in which the statutory wording and statutory context were
closely analyzed. The majority recognized that there are "wide areas" of
ministerial discretion "where a political judgment of the national interest
must prevail," but on the facts before them they were not prepared to
abdicate responsibility. 36 A unanimous Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council, however, overturned the Court of Appeal, echoing the view of the
dissenting appellate judge in New Zealand, Richardson, J., who voiced
concern about "the constitutional and democratic implications of judicial
involvement in wider issues of public policy and public interest."37 There
are limits, he insisted, to the democratic acceptability of judicial review of
administrative action.
The problems of judicial restraint and judicial activism are well
recognized in the literature of constitutional law in the United States. In
England the same problems have inevitably been highlighted in
administrative law, sometimes expressed in terms of judicial restraint and at
other times in terms of justiciability. At first sight, it may seem paradoxical
that judicial restraint should loom largest in cases affecting the central
government, for in reality the courts are not dealing with Ministers but with
the often anonymous civil or public servants who are shielded by the
doctrine of ministerial responsibility; the "democratic" obstacles to judicial

34.
35.
36.
37.

See Petrocorp Exploration Ltd. v. Minister of Energy [1991 ] I N.Z.L.R. 641.
Petrocorp Exploration Ltd. v. Minister of Energy [1991] 1 N.z.L.R. I, 15 (per Greig, J.).
Petrocorp, 1 N.Z.L.R. at 38 (per Cooke, P.).
Petrocorp, I N.Z.L.R. at 46 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
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intervention would seem to be remote. The "democratic" element would
seem to be much more relevant at the level of local government, where
locally elected councillors are closer to the voting booth and the wishes of
the electors. Perhaps the greater prominence accorded to judicial restraint
at the level of central government stems more from judicial deference in the
face of what is deemed to be greater expertise in government departments.
Further, in light of a blurring of the line between parliamentary and
executive power between Westminster and Whitehall, challenges to
Ministers' powers in areas of wide policy entrusted to them by
parliamentary legislation might seem to be close to challenging the
legislation itself. The judicial deference may have slackened of late, but one
should not underrate the importance of a legacy of heavily centralized
government based in London.
Local authorities, in the vanguard of many administrative developments
from the mid-nineteenth century in particular and-as we have
seen-compensating in part for the absence of a distribution of legislative
and executive power elsewhere in the United Kingdom, were, however, early
on given their own doctrine of judicial restraint based upon arguments of
local democracy. At the end of the nineteenth century, the Divisional Court
of the Queen's Bench Division-sitting exceptionally as a panel of seven
judges rather than the usual two or three-heard, in a criminal appeal, a
challenge to a bylaw enacted by a local authority. The case was Kruse v.
Johnson.38 In the course of his judgment, the Lord Chief Justice stated
that the actions of public representative bodies should be supported if
possible; they should be benevolently interpreted; and credit should be given
to those responsible for administering bylaws so that they will be reasonably
administered. This doctrine of benevolent interpretation has been used over
the years in response to challenges to all forms of local authority action, not
just to the rather more formal legislative area of by-laws and their
enforcement. Kruse v. Johnson has been cited as the guideline in a
remarkable number of cases in common law jurisdictions outside as well as
inside the United Kingdom.
In the House of Lords in Roberts v. Hopwood, some consideration was
given to Kruse v. Johnson. Lord Buckmaster said that the discretion
entrusted to Poplar Council was a wide one, and he agreed with the

38.

Kruse v. Johnson [18981 2 Q.B. 91.
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principle "that when such a discretion is conferred upon a local authority the
Court ought to show great reluctance before they attempt to determine how,
in their opinion, the discretion ought to be exercised."3 9 Lord Sumner
significantly conceded that the courts
often accept the decisions of the local authority simply because they
are themselves ill equipped to weigh the merits of one solution of
a practical question as against another. This, however, is not a
recognition of the absolute character of the local authority's
discretion,
but of the limits within which it is practicable to question
°
it.

Furthermore, Lord Sumner had no doubts about the delimitation of the
powers of Poplar Council.
In the Court of Appeal, Kruse v. Johnson loomed larger. Scrutton, L.J.,
spoke, for instance, of the "wide powers" entrusted by Parliament, of "the
reasonable limits of discretion in a representative body," and of a "wide
margin of error" being allowed for error of judgment.4 ' For his part, he
would not have sanctioned the minimum wage adopted by Poplar but, for
the financial year in question, he did not feel that the acceptable line had
been crossed. His dissenting colleague, Bankes, L.J., saw the drawing of the
' and proceeded
line as "extremely difficult"42
to find that, in the "actual
existing circumstances," it had been crossed. The difference of emphasis in
judicial approach, however, is especially shown in the judgment of the
second majority judge, Atkin, L.J. Given the breadth of the statutory power
allowed to the councillors-to pay such salaries or wages as they "may
think fit"-he immediately asked whether the Council had "unfettered
discretion" or whether the council must conform to an objective standard of
reasonableness. He settled for unfettered discretion, subject only to the
restriction that the Council should act in good faith, a term (admittedly
vague) that he saw as preventing the Council, for instance, from fixing the
amount of wages "as a dole or as a bribe, or with any object other than that

39.
40.
41.
42.

Hopwood [1925] App. Cas. at 588.
Id. at 607.
The King v. Roberts, exparte Scurr [1924] 2 K.B. 695, 719-21.
Id. at 709-10.
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of fairly remunerating the servant." 43 In other words, the powers must be
exercised honestly.
The view taken by Atkin, L.J., may seem at variance with that which he
eloquently adopted in Liversidge v. Anderson. In fact, he showed
remarkable consistency in his approach to subjectively-worded powers. Had
the Minister's power in Liversidge v. Anderson been couched in subjective
terms, it is clear that he would have agreed that the Home Secretary's
decision was immune from judicial review. His heroic dissent in 1941
should not obscure the fact that, in an almost simplistic acceptance of
unreviewable discretion based on often fortuitous statutory wording, he was
a man of his times.
In his judgment in Roberts v. Hopwood, Atkin, L.J., fortunately went on
to consider the alternative proposition, namely, that the discretion should be
controlled, that there was a requirement to pay reasonable wages. Here we
see evidence of his eloquence at its best. Apart from a rigorous rejection
of the so-called fiduciary duty to ratepayers ("the duty of the council," he
said, "is to the local community as a whole"), he emphasized, in his own
words, that it is "essential to remember that we are dealing with powers
given to public bodies consisting of representatives elected by the public on
a wide franchise for comparatively short periods"4 5 and, in the words of the
Lord Chief Justice in Kruse v. Johnson, that "such representatives may be
trusted to understand their own requirements better than judges."
In
addition, he spoke of a heavy onus on those who allege unreasonableness
"in cases of this kind" and he was satisfied on the facts that the wages paid
were not so unreasonable as to be ultra vires to the council.47
The two Lord Justices-Scrutton and Atkin-stood alone in the
proceedings. Their judgment was to their judicial colleagues, just as Lord
Sumner described the original resolution of Poplar Council and its wide
rejection by other local authorities,48 vox clamantis in deserto.

43.

Id. at 725.

44.
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47.
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Id. at 726.
Id. at 725-26.
Id. at 727 (quoting from Kruse v. Johnson [1898] 2 Q.B. 91, 99).
Id. at 727-29.
Hopwood [1925] App. Cas. at 609.
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V. THE AFTERMATH: POPLARISM AND BEYOND
The district auditor, vindicated by the House of Lords, continued to
disallow and surcharge in subsequent financial years, but no money was
paid over by the councillors. Instead they sought remission of the
surcharges by application to the Minister, and the relevant Minister (Neville
The remission was granted
Chamberlain) eventually did so remit.
reluctantly, but the Government had no stomach for a second round of
imprisoning the councillors, this time for refusing to respond to the
surcharges. Large commercial ratepayers of Poplar were outraged, however,
and they chose John Dore, a former councillor opposed to the majority, to
instigate a legal challenge through certiorari to quash the remission." John
Dore succeeded, on grounds of statutory construction, and the Minister was
left exposed.
That decision was handed down on St. Valentine's Day 1927. Given
the urgency of the political situation, the law had proceeded in a leisurely
way. The rule nisi allowing John Dore to proceed was granted on 29 July
1926, and legal argument in court did not take place until the following
January and February. More recently, in the aftermath of the reform of
remedies in 1977, the speed of judicial review has often been stressed. In
a major case involving rulemaking or subordinate legislation in 1984, for
instance, the Master of the Rolls pointed out that leave to apply was granted
on 28 November, the application was heard and dismissed on 6 and 7
December, the appeal was heard in the Court of Appeal less than a week
later, and judgment was given some days before Christmas. The Master of
the Rolls went on to comment that "in some other jurisdictions the timetable
would be regarded with some surprise, not to say envy. I mention the
matter not in any spirit of complacency, but merely in order to
counterbalance the well justified complaints which are sometimes made of
the law's delays."5 Unfortunately, the success of the revolution in English
administrative law has brought in its train the pressures of time on the
judiciary and the legal profession, and litigants may now, in some
circumstances, expect serious delays before their cases come before the
courts. This is a development scarcely in tune with the demands of good

49. The King v. Minister of Health, ex parte Dore [1927] 1 K.B. 765.
50. Regina v. Her Majesty's Treasury, ex parte Smedley [1985] 1 Q.B. 657, 664-65.
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administration, though Neville Chamberlain in 1926 and 1927 may have
welcomed the delay.
Now faced with the adverse decision early in 1927, the Minister had at
hand a device that is not easily available in the United States at federal or
state level. He turned to legislation, and the result was the Audit (Local
Authorities) Bill which, on the one hand, increased the sanctions against
defaulting councillors in the future and, on the other hand, wiped the slate
clean as to existing surcharges. 5
The doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty and the absence of
constitutional inhibitions about retrospectivity mean that there is an
effective, if infrequently invoked, final weapon in the hands of Government.
In the mid-1960s, to take a later example, the House of Lords held that the
government of the day had to pay compensation for the destruction of oil
installations in Burma in 1942. The Government responded by securing the
War Damage Act 1965, overriding the decision and preventing any such
payments in the future.52 When the Government has an absolute majority
in the House of Commons (as British governments usually do), legislation
can be brought in with remarkable speed as well. The Official Secrets Bill
1911 went through all of its stages (including the committee stage) in the
House of Commons in less than half an hour, in light of what seemed to be
the imminence of war with Germany; one or two doubting Members of
Parliament were even forcibly pulled back into their seats. The Minister
who introduced the Bill that day devoted a paragraph to the events in his
memoirs, concluding with the words that:
to the eternal honor of those members, to whom I now offer, on
behalf of that and all succeeding governments, my most grateful
thanks, not one man seriously opposed, and in a little more time
than it has taken to write these words that formidable piece of
legislation was passed.53
As Poplarism gradually faded after the anticlimax of 1927, Roberts v.
Hopwood remained a leading case. An outstanding and controversial
54 in the
example of its application was Prescottv. Birmingham Corporation
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See NOREEN BRANSON, supra note 5, ch 14; Keith-Lucas, supra note 5, at 74-75.
Burmah Oil Co. Ltd. v. Lord Advocate [1965] App. Cas. 75.
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J.E.B. SEELY, ADVENTURE 145 (1930).
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mid-1950s. The Corporation had resolved, in operating a municipal bus
service where they had statutory authority to charge such fares as they saw
fit, to offer free travel to women over 65 and men over 70. A local
ratepayer sought an injunction to stop the scheme, and the judge at first
instance granted the injunction on the grounds that the nationwide plight of
old-age pensioners was a matter for Parliament and that the Corporation had
shown "an excess of misplaced philanthropic zeal."" The Court of Appeal
agreed, and no further appeal was heard. In the Court of Appeal, Jenkins,
L.J., drew parallels to ordinary business practices; hence, concessions to
children were acceptable because they were made by commercial bus
companies, and existing concessions to the blind and disabled might not be
strictly justifiable but could be classed as "a minor act of elementary charity
to which no reasonable ratepayer would be likely to object. 56 The
decision once again embarrassed the Government because several local
authorities already had similar schemes in operation, so the Public Service
Vehicles (Travel Concessions) Act 1955 was duly enacted to legitimate
existing schemes including that in Birmingham. Finally,,soon after a Labour
government was voted to power in 1964, the Travel Concessions Act of that
year permitted schemes of free travel for specified classes of the community
in all local authority areas.
In the early 1980s the Greater London Council (GLC), then one of the
most powerful local authorities in the world, introduced a scheme reducing
the general level of fares on bus and underground services run by the
London Transport Executive. GLC had a new Labour majority and the legal
challenge to the legitimacy of the scheme was bound to be highly politically
charged.5" In a matter of weeks the case for judicial review was heard by
the High Court, which held for the GLC, and by the Court of Appeal and
the House of Lords, both of which fiercely held against the GLC. Both
Roberts v. Hopwood and Prescott v. Birmingham Corporationwere widely
cited, and there were dutiful gestures towards judicial restraint in considering
the actions of elected bodies. Lord Wilberforce stressed that "the GLC,
though a powerful body, with an electorate larger and a budget more
considerable than those of many nation states, is the creation of statute and
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57.
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Id. at 226.
Id. at 236.
See Bromley London Borough Council v. Greater London Council [1982] I All E.R. 129
H.L.).

1994]

LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION

only has the powers given to it by statute.
[I]ts actions, unlike those of
Parliament, are examinable by the courts.
"58 In the Court of Appeal,
Oliver, L.J., echoed Atkin, L.J., in stressing the burden on those who allege
abuse of discretion, but he went on to say that the question "is not one of
what is socially just or desirable but of what Parliament has authorized and
of the propriety of the exercise of the statutory discretion entrusted to a
statutory body . . . ."" Impropriety, Lord Oliver added, "is no less an
impropriety because it is or can be said to be a politically motivated
impropriety."' The Greater London Council lost not only its case but also
its future, and it was not long before the Government had plans under way
for its abolition, which was achieved by legislation in 1985.
VI. CONCLUSION

In the course of this paper I have covered ground that would not be
unfamiliar to English administrative lawyers, and my aim has been to
emphasize and illustrate the tangles in which the courts can find themselves
when they seek to control the exercise of discretionary power. Roberts v.
Hopwood and the differing views expressed in the different courts seem to
have anticipated, to a remarkable extent, the problems of later and more
litigious years.
More generally, the variability of the principles of abuse of discretion
has been stressed in countless cases. For example, in a leading New
6
Zealand decision of the 1980s, CREEDNZ Inc. v. Governor-General,
Richardson, J., in the Court of Appeal, stressed that "there is no universal
role as to the principles on which the exercise of a discretion may be
reviewed" and that the willingness of the courts to intervene "must be
affected by the nature and subject-matter of the decision in question and by
consideration of the constitutional role of the body entrusted by statute with
the exercise of the power."
In English administrative law relating to abuse of discretion, local
authorities have remained important over the years. This means in effect
that the map of the case law looks very different from that familiar in the

58. Id. at 154.
59. Id. at 145.
60. Id. at 149.
61. [1981] I N.Z.L.R. 172, 197-98.
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United States. Even the case (decided in 1947) most commonly cited as
setting out the principles of abuse of discretion--expressed by Lord Greene
in language that means all things to all men-arose from the actions of a
local authority: Associated ProvincialPicture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury
6 2 This so-called Wednesbury case, perhaps the most cited case
Corporation.
in English administrative law, overshadows Roberts v. Hopwood in the
textbooks and the courts. I believe that the Wednesbury principles had
already been anticipated by Poplar,which only lacked some refinements,
but that Wednesbury captured the judicial imagination partly because it was
a post-war case and partly because it lacked the passion and the fury that lay
behind Roberts v. Hopwood sixty-five to seventy years ago. Wednesbury
could therefore be cited more brazenly as a Baedeker guide to abuse of
discretion, partly because the principles in Roberts v. Hopwood were set out
in scattered dicta in several courts and lacked the compact, confident sweep
of Lord Greene's words in 1947.
Both cases, Wednesbury and Hopwood, are appropriately cited or citable
at all levels of challenge to administrative action, at central and local level
and with regard to other governmental or quasi-governmental bodies. Also,
they vividly reveal the extent of judicial discretion in the application of very
broad principles, and it is significant that in English administrative law this
judicial discretion is called upon at various stages of an application for
judicial review: at the leave stage, when (as we have seen) the arguability
of a submission can be considered; in determining whether to order
interrogatories, discovery of documents, or cross-examination; in applying
the Wednesbury principles at the substantive hearing; and, finally, in
deciding what remedy to award or, even if the substantive case has been
argued successfully, in deciding whether to grant a remedy at all. Judicial
discretion can, in other words, create formidable obstacles in the face of an
application for judicial review, and even at the last much can happen
between the stirrup and the ground. The broth created by the combined
ingredients of administrative discretion and judicial discretion would have
delighted the witches in Macbeth. From the legal practitioner's viewpoint,
advising possible applicants-under tight timing requirements that again are
subject to judicial discretion---can be perilous, and when legal aid is not
available, there are unpredictable problems of costs.
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Moreover, legal practitioners recognize that the facts of each case are
crucial, that there are often critical problems of evidence, and that
administrators have to administer. In a mid-1980s case, a young woman had
been refused a local authority grant to pursue higher education.63 One of
the sensitive features of the English education system is that of student
grants which, subject to a means test, assist attendance at universities. A
central issue in this case was whether the local authority, which had refused
a discretionary grant, had given sufficient reasons to the court to explain its
refusal. The Court of Appeal accepted that, with regard to one of thousands
of similar discretionary decisions regarding student grants, a local authority
could not be expected to list seriatim all the factors that it considered and
that an applicant for a grant should not be permitted, simply because leave
to apply for judicial review had been granted, to. seek a detailed description
of every step in the local authority's decision. On the other hand, a local
authority should not be allowed to get away with a blanket or ritualistic
response to the courts, and Parker, L.J., stressed that the sanctions available
to a judge included that of proceeding to discovery and interrogatories or
alternatively granting relief on the basis of the prima facie case submitted
by the applicant. The Master of the Rolls, Lord Donaldson, pointed out that
a public authority, with all the information at its command, should operate
"with all the cards face upwards on the table. '64 Clearly there are powers
available to the courts in the face of obstructive public authorities.
Enthusiasm to control administrative discretion should not delude the
courts into thinking that such control is invariably accepted or acceptable.
Public servants can fight back, as can local elected councillors, and it is
worthy of note that in 1987 the civil service in Britain produced an internal
pamphlet entitled The Judge Over Your Shoulder.6 5 The document showed
great puzzlement and uncertainty as to the range ofjudicial intervention, and
implicitly it seemed to echo Felix Frankfurter's words of over sixty years
ago that the "all too common depreciation of men in public service is at
once shallow and cruel. It mocks when it should praise; it debilitates when
it should encourage." 66 More recently an English appellate judge made a
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similar comment about local authorities: the vast majority of their elected
members, he said, "perform without fear or favour tasks in the public
service, yet experience shows that they receive as a result more brick-bats
than bouquets."6 '
Roberts v. Hopwood was a faraway case where the brick-bats flew, the
courts and a local authority became embattled, and some principles,
guidelines, and lessons emerged. The underlying approach of the courts,
then and now, can be interpreted only by taking into account the special
circumstances in which litigation arises and the special factors that are called
into play. There are no hard and fast rules.

67. R. v. Barnet and Camden Rent Tribunal, ex parte Frey Investments Ltd. [1972] 1 All E.R.
1185, 1194 (per Edmund Davies, L.J.).

